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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(1962) (contract cancelable upon thirty days notice by either
party), and Desrosiers v. Commissioner, 21 CCH TAx CT. MEM.
264 (1962) (contract terminable by either party on thirty days
notice after the first one hundred twenty days). In Utah Alloy
Ores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 917 (1960), the contracts were
for terms of one year unless the operator failed to work the claim
but depletion was disallowed since a term of one year was not
sufficient to mine the claims to exhaustion. Thus, it would appear
that there must be a reasonable probability that coal will be mined
to exhaustion under the contract before the courts will allow a
depletion allowance to taxpayer mining under the contract.
The Parsons case, supra, laid down seven guide-lines for aid in
interperting an "economic interest". Subsequent decisions have
interpreted the Parsons case to mean that stripping rights terminable
on minimal notice are not a sufficient interest to support depletion,
and that the factor of terminability should be given top priority in
the court's determination of an "economic interest". In accord with
this interpretation, the court held in the principal case that a
contract conferring the right to terminate the contract only on
grounds of default by the strip miner or lack of profitability to
the lessee was not an agreement terminable at will or on short
notice. The court based its decision almost entirely on termin-
ability as the Parsons case was similar in every instance except
for the limited right of termination. In the future, the courts will
look to the terminability of the contract to determine if the strip
miner has an "economic interest". It would appear that the test
of terminability of a contract to depletion cases may eliminate much
of the vagueness and uncertainty that has previously existed.
Ward Day Stone, Jr.
Income Taxation-Contribution to Employees' Savings Trust
Action for refund of income tax. P sought deduction from gross
income as a business expense money contributed by transfer to
employee savings trust fund. The three year trust, established in
1950, permitted employees to join through wage withholdings with
P matching all contributions equally. Under no circumstance was P
to receive back sums contributed. If his employment was termin-
ated because of death, retirement, disability, or layoff, the em-
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ployee received the amount set aside from wages plus the matched
amount of P. If terminated voluntarily or discharged for cause,
the employee would receive only his contribution. Contributions
and earnings were distributed January 2, 1953, two days after
termination of the trust. Tax Commissioner disallowed deduction.
Held, reversed. Statute allows as deduction money paid to cer-
tain trust funds during the taxable year when paid to employees
if nonforfeitable by employees at that time. Mississippi River Fuel
Corp. v. United States, 314 F.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. No. 180-60, 1963).
The principal case was decided upon the same reasoning and
under a substantially similar factual situation as Russell Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 833, 175 F.Supp. 159 (1959). The
ruling in both cases turned upon the interpretation of I 'T. REv.
CODE of 1939, § 23 (p) (1) (D) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 404 (a) (5)). The result in both instances is contra to earlier
rulings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In order to
understand the problems involved, it is necessary to investigate
the position taken by the Commissioner in both cases.
In 1942, § 23 (p) (now Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 404) became
the exclusive section for deductions of this nature. The 1942
amendment was designed to grant tax advantages to encourage
pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans which could qualify
under certain non-discriminatory requirements set forth in § 165 (a)
(now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 401). If an employer could qual-
ify under these requirements, he was given favorable treatment
in § 23 (p) (1) (A), (B), or (C). Otherwise, it was necessary
to "qualify" under § 23 (p) (1) (D) or no deduction would be
allowed. Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra.
INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 23 (p) (1) (D) provided:
"If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a
stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or if
compensation is paid or accrued on account of any employee
under a plan deferring the receipt of such compensation, such
contributions or compensation shall not be deductible under
subsection (a) but shall be deductible, if deductible under
subsection (a) without regard to this subsection, under this
subsection but only to the following extent:
"(D) In the taxable year when paid, if the plan is not one
included in paragraphs (A), (B), or (C): if the employees'
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rights to or derived from such employer's contribution or such
compensation are nonforfeitable at the time the contribution
or compensation is paid."
The Treasury Department interpreted § 23 (p) (1) (D) to
mean "if an amount is paid during the taxable year but the rights
of the employee therein are forfeitable at the time the amount is
paid, no deduction is allowed for such amount for any taxable
year." Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(p)-11 (1943), as amended, T.D.
5666, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 46 (now Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12
(1956)). The Commissioner construed the words of § 23 (p) (1)
(D) "in the taxable year" to mean "in the taxable year when paid by
the employer." In the principal case at the time the contributions
were paid by the employer, the employees' rights were clearly for-
feitable; therefore, the Commissioner argued the plan did not "quali-
fy" under § 23 (p) (1) (D). The court in overruling this interpreta-
tion said that while it is clear that Congress intended to give certain
tax advantages to plans qualifying under § 165 (a) (now INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 401) it did not intend to disallow deductions
as ordinary and necessary business expenses compensation paid
under plans that "qualify" under § 23 (p) (1) (D). That this
plan did "qualify" under § 23 (p) (1) (D) was clear to the
court, the rights being nonforfeitable in the taxable year when
paid to the employees. In Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra,
the court construed the statute to mean that compensation paid
to employees shall be deductible in the year of distribution if
nonforfeitable in that year. The statute provided that compensa-
tion paid to the employee shall be deductible; whereas the Com-
missioner relied upon the wording which said that contributions
paid by the employer shall be deductible.
The Commissioner further argued that there could be no de-
duction under the plan in the principal case if the statute meant
"in the taxable year when paid by the employer," becauce pay-
ment was made by the trustee. The court felt, however, that
payment by a trustee had been anticipated. The statute refers to
"contributions paid by the employer," but in using the term com-
pensation, it fails to say "paid by the employer."
In 1954 Congress failed to enact a provision which would have
changed § 23 (p) (1) (D) to read "in the taxable year when the
amount is actually distributed or made available to a distributee."
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Upon arguing legislative intent, the Commissioner said that ap-
parently Congress was satisfied with the section as it existed and
with the treasury regulation. As to the rejection of this revision,
the court found that the change would not only have specifically
allowed deductions as in this situation; it would also have allowed
deductions in the year in which it was set aside by the employer,
even though nonforfeitable at that time. It was not possible to
determine what Congress was approving or disapproving by re-
jecting such a revision. Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra.
In the principal case, the court placed heavy emphasis upon
public policy. It felt that to deny such a deduction would be to
penalize the employer with progressive plans and to encourage
the use of less favorable ones. If the employer, for example, mere-
ly agreed to pay the money, but did not set it aside, his contribu-
tions when made would be clearly deductible. Rev. Rul. 525,
1955-2 Ctum. BurnL. 543 would permit a deduction for just such a
plan. Thus to follow the treasury regulation and disallow a de-
duction in the principal case would have created the anomolous
situation where under the regulations the employer who gives the
employees the lesser protection is afforded the greater tax benefit.
It appears that if such a case again reaches the Commissioner,
the same conflict will arise. The Commissioner is not bound by the
Court of Claims, and there is no apparent evidence that the former
has any intention of altering the regulation. This is certainly
needless litigation with which the taxpayer should not be bur-
dened. The decision of the court does not weaken the advantages
legislatively granted to qualifying funds. Nor is there any appar-
ent reason why allowance of these deductions would work to give
a taxpayer undue advantage. The court's reasoning appears to be
the better interpretation, and leaves two alternatives: The Com-
missioner should acquiesce; or Congress should be encouraged to
enact a more clearly worded statute.
Charles Ellsworth Heilmann
Legislation-Admission of Extrinsic Evidence to Show
Irregularities in Passage of Bill
Relators, both corporations, were indicted under a 1963 West
Virginia statute which barred certain business activities on Sun-
day. By writ of prohibition brought against the county judge and
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